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THE ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF
AIRLINE DEREGULATION
JERRY L. BEANE*
T HE DEBATE over the merits of airline deregulation is now
moot.' The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978' (Deregulation
Act) has significantly altered the aviation industry in the United
States. After fifty years of economic regulation, the airlines find
themselves faced with a myriad of new economic and legal prob-
lems. At the forefront of these new challenges are the issues re-
sulting from the increased application of the federal antitrust laws
to the activities of the aviation industry.
I. COMPETITION AND THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
A central theme underlying the free enterprise system is "that
the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the
best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the
highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the
same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation
of our democratic political and social institutions."' The federal
antitrust laws are designed to preserve such free and unfettered
competition as the rule of trade. Certain industries, however, have,
for a variety of reasons, become the subject of pervasive regulatory
* BA., 1965, Baylor University; J.D., 1967, Baylor University; partner, Stras-
burger and Price, Dallas, Texas.
IThe autumn 1975 issue of the Journal of Air Law and Commerce was a
symposium issue regarding regulatory reform in the aviation industry. Selected
Problems in Aviation Litigation, 41 J. AIR L. & CoM. 175 (1975). Subsequent
articles in the Journal continued to debate the subject. See, e.g., Thornton,
Deregulation: The C.A.B. and Its Critics, 43 J. AiR L. & CoM. 641 (1977);
Thayer, And Now "The Deregulators": When Will They Learn?, 43 J. AIR L
& COM. 661 (1977).
2Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. §5
1301-1542 (Supp. 1979)) [hereinafter cited only to current code].
3 Northern Pac. RR. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (Black, J.).
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systems established by Congress. In such instances, an extensive
regulatory scheme, often with administrative enforcement authority,
results in a judicial effort to establish meaningful coexistence be-
tween the goals and concepts of the antitrust laws and administra-
tive regulation."
As a vital part of the nation's transportation system, the avia-
tion industry was viewed by Congress as invested with the public
interest. Thus, in 1938, the Civil Aeronautics Act was passed.
The forces at work within the industry at that time were described
this way:
Competition among air carriers is being carried to an extreme,
which tends to jeopardize the financial status of the air carriers
and to jeopardize and render unsafe a transportation service
appropriate to the needs of commerce and required in the public
interest, in the interests of the Postal Service, and of the national
defense.'
The original Act, and it successor, the Federal Aviation Act of
1958,' established substantial and significant economic regulation
of the airline industry. Fares,' route entry9 and route abandon-
ment 0 were delegated to the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB or
Board) as appropriate subjects for regulatory consideration and
control.
Certain specific types of transactions within the airline indus-
try were required to be approved by the Board. Such approval
then constituted automatic immunity from the federal antitrust
laws.'1 Additional provisions of the regulatory scheme required
the Board to consider and prevent unjust, unfair and anticompeti-
4In United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 191 (1939), the Court stated:
"Court and agency are the means adopted to attain the prescribed end, and so
far as their duties are defined by the words of the statute, those words should
be construed so as to attain that end through coordinated action."
5 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 1027 (1938) (current ver-
sion at 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1542 (Supp. 1979)).
'S. REP. No. 1661, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1937).
772 Stat. 731 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1542 (Supp. 1979)
[hereinafter cited only to current code].
$49 U.S.C.A. § 1374 (Supp. 1979).
Old. § 1371(d)(1).
'Old. S 1371(j).
11 Id. § 1384.
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tive activities in the airline industry." The Deregulation Act sig-
nificantly alters the mandated policy considerations which are to
guide the Board in its functions and changes and eliminates much
of the previously automatic antitrust immunity for the airline
industry.
A. Policy Considerations
For twenty years section 102 of the Federal Aviation Act of
195813 provided the mandate to the Board in the performance of
its powers and duties. The section required that the Board should
consider the following factors as being in the public interest and
in accordance with the public convenience and necessity: "(d)
Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound develop-
ment of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the
needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of
the United States Postal Service and of the national defense;...,1
Thus, competition within the aviation industry was to be con-
sidered only to the "extent necessary" to assure the development
of an air transportation system. Competition was a secondary con-
sideration in the economic regulation of the aviation industry.
The Deregulation Act significantly altered the policy and public
interest considerations for airline regulation. Three new guide-
lines were established by Congress as matters to be considered as
being in the public interest and in accordance with the public
convenience and necessity:
(4) [t]he placement of maximum reliance on competitive market
forces and on actual and potential competition (A) to provide
the needed air transportation system, and (B) to encourage effi-
cient and well-managed carriers to earn adequate profits and to
attract capital.
(7) [t]he prevention of unfair, deceptive, predatory or anti-com-
petitive practices in air transportation, and the avoidance of-
A. unreasonable industry concentration, excessive market domi-
nation, and monopoly power; and
B. other conditions;
12 Id. S§ 1302, 1381.
13 Id. § 1302.
141Id. S 1302(d).
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that would tend to allow one or more air carriers unreasonably
to increase prices, reduce services, or exclude competition in air
transportation.
(9) [t]he encouragement, development, and maintenance of an air
transportation system relying on actual and potential competition
to provide efficiency, innovation, and low prices, and to deter-
mine the variety, quality, and price of air transportation services."
Thus, the dramatic change from relying on competition to the
"extent necessary" to placing "maximum reliance" on competitive
conditions in the marketplace dramatically alters the decisional
process which the Board must make when implementing its duties
and responsibilities. The intention of Congress is clear: the Board
is to utilize competition to achieve regulatory goals while a com-
petitive industry is designated as a goal in itself.
Although the precise impact of competitive considerations by
the Board has yet to be fully determined, certain indications of
the philosophy of the Board, as discussed later, can be ascertained.
Additionally, the Deregulation Act makes substantial changes in
four other sections of the Federal Aviation Act which directly
relate to the application of the antitrust laws to the aviation
industry.
B. Consolidation, Merger and Control
Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act!' required Board ap-
proval for any consolidation, merger or acquisition of control of
any air carrier or its properties by a person engaged in "any phase
of aeronautics.""' The section mandated Board approval for any
consolidation, merger, or acquisition of control unless the Board
found that the same "[would] not be consistent with the public
interest."" A proviso required that the Board not approve a pro-
posed consolidation, merger or acquisition of control which would
result in creating a monopoly or monopolies and thereby restrain
competition." Thus, section 408 permitted those enumerated trans-
"Id. § 1302(a)(4), (7), (9).






actions that are not inconsistent with the public interest and
that will not result in a monopoly." Judicial construction of sec-
tion 408 of the Federal Aviation Act interpreted the statute as
requiring that the Board first determine whether the monopoly
proviso would be violated. If the proposed transaction did not
violate this proviso, the Board then had to find that the disadvant-
age of any curtailment of competition would be outweighed by the
advantages of improved service, i.e., that the transaction would be
in the public interest."
The Deregulation Act amended section 408 in several material
respects. Now, Board approval is required only for consolidations,
mergers or acquisitions of control involving a "person substantially
engaged in the business of aeronautics."" The Deregulation Act
also makes significant changes in the tests which the Board must
apply in considering whether to approve an acquisition of con-
trol transaction. The section mandates that the Board shall approve
the proposed transaction unless it finds that it "will not be con-
sistent with the public interest."' The section further provides that
the Board shall not approve a transaction:
(1) If it would result in a monopoly or be in furtherance of
any combination or conspiracy to monopolize or to any attempt
to monopolize the business of air transportation in any region of
the United States; or
(2) The effect of which on any region of the United States may
be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monop-
oly, or which in any other manner would be in restraint of trade.24
The Board may, however, approve a transaction which would
result in one of the proscriptions described in (1) or (2) above
if it specifically finds: (a) the anticompetitive effects of the pro-
posed transaction are outweighed in the public interest by the
probable effect of the transaction in meeting significant transpor-
tation conveniences and needs of the public; and (b) such sig-
"'Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 367-68
(1973).
21Foreign Study League v. CAB, 475 F.2d 865 (10th Cir. 1973); Butler
Aviation Co. v. CAB, 389 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1968).
-49 U.S.C.A. § 1378 (Supp. 1979).
23 Id. S 1378(b)(1).
24 1d.
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nificant conveniences and needs may be satisfied by a reasonably
available alternative having materially less anticompetitive effect.'
Congress explained the new tests to be applied by the Board
regarding an acquisition of control transaction:
The intent of the new section 408 of the proposed legislation is
to insure that, in light of deregulation, mergers in the air carrier
industry will be tested by the antitrust standards traditionally
applied by the courts to unregulated industries. However, under
the new section 408, even if a merger does not meet the antitrust
standards of the Sherman and Clayton Acts it may nonetheless
be approved if it meets "significant transportation needs of the
community to be served," and if there is no "reasonably available
less anticompetitive alternative" to the merger. These latter tests
only apply if a merger or similar transaction does not meet the
Sherman and Clayton Act standards."
The amended section 408 requires that the party challenging
the transaction shall bear the burden of proving the anticompeti-
tive effect of the transaction. The proponents of the transaction
will bear the burden of proving that it meets the significant trans-
portation conveniences and needs of the public and that such
conveniences and needs may not be satisfied by less anticompetitive
alternatives."7 The section further establishes notice provisions to
the Attorney General, the Secretary of Transportation and other
persons known to have a substantial interest in the proceeding.'
Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act thus now incorporates
the traditional antitrust standards by which mergers are analyzed
and tested. The section does, however, provide that mergers which
might otherwise transgress such standards may be approved if
they meet significant transportation needs of the public and such
needs cannot be satisfied by less anticompetitive alternatives.
Board authority to approve section 408 transactions, as they
relate to "interstate and overseas air transportation" will be trans-
ferred to the Department of Justice effective January 1, 1983."
5 Id.
"Joint Explanatory Statement of the Comm. of Conference of the House
and Senate on S. 2493, H.R. REP. No. 1779, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 72-73 (1978).
2749 U.S.C.A. § 1378(b)(1) (Supp. 1979).
28 Id.
"1Id. § 1551(a) (3).
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Board authority under section 408 relating to "foreign air trans-
portation" will be transferred to the Department of Justice on
January 1, 1985.*
C. Interlocking Relationships
Section 409 of the Federal Aviation Act3' required Board ap-
proval of interlocking officer, director or controlling shareholder
interest between an air carrier, a common carrier or any other
person engaged in any phase of aeronautics. The section required
that Board approval be predicated on a finding that the relation-
ship would not adversely affect the public interest.' An inter-
locking relationship violating section 409 is unlawful per se un-
less approved by the Board.' The courts, however, have the
authority to determine whether a relationship violates section 409
without first requiring a determination by the Board."
The Deregulation Act amended the provisions of section 409
to prohibit the designated relationships, inter alia, with any per-
son "substantially engaged in the business of aeronautics."' This
amendment, as with a similar change in language in section 408,
narrows the class of relationships which must be approved by the
Board.'
The authority of the Board to approve interlocking relation-
ships under section 409, as the same relate to "interstate" and
"overseas air transportation," will be transferred to the Depart-
ment of Justice on January 1, 1983." Board authority relating to
"foreign air transportation" under section 409 will be transferred
to the Department of Justice on January 1, 1985.'
D. Pooling and Other Agreements
Section 412 of the Federal Aviation Act required every air
3Id. § 1551(b)(1)(C).
31 Id. § 1379.
81Id. S 1379(a).
I"Hutcheson v. O'Carroll, 251 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1958).
"Id.
"49 U.S.C.A. § 1379 (Supp. 1979).
"Dubuc, Significant Legislative Developments in the Field of Aviation Law,
45 J. AnR L. & COM. 1, 27 (1979).
349 U.S.C.A. S 1551(a)(3) (Supp. 1979).
- Id. § 1551(b)(1)(C).
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carrier to file with the Board every contract affecting air trans-
portation between an air carrier and any other air carrier for pool-
ing of service or equipment or relating to rates or fares and in-
cluding any agreements for "controlling, regulating, preventing or
otherwise eliminating destructive, oppressive or wasteful competi-
tion." The section required the Board to disapprove any such
agreement which was adverse to the public interest and mandated
approval by the Board of any such agreement which it did not find
to be adverse to the public interest.'
The types of agreements contemplated by section 412 are ob-
viously violative of the antitrust laws and would subject air car-
riers to antitrust liability except for immunity resulting from Board
approval. Among the types of anticompetitive agreements approved
under section 412 are agreements among three major air carriers
concerning the number and scheduling of flights in twenty major
United States markets as a result of the 1973 fuel crisis;" the
establishment of a jointly owned common agent to maintain a
pickup and delivery service for air freight;" an agreement between
two foreign air carriers for temporary changes in overseas routes
and the exchange of certain routes; ' and an agreement between
three major air carriers reducing flights between four city-pair
markets in the United States."
The governing standard for approval of agreements under former
section 412 was whether the same was found to be "adverse to the
public interest."' In assessing and applying this standard, the
Board was required to rest its approval of an agreement on a
justification of serious transportation needs or important public
benefits. ' Among the factors the Board was required to consider
in assessing the "public interest," were the anticompetitive impli-
cations of any agreement and the welfare of air carrier em-
31 Id. § 1382(a).
-Id. 5 1382(b).
4 1 United States v. CAB, 511 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
'Big Bear Cartage, Inc. v. Air Cargo, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 982 (N.D. Ill.
1976).
" Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 539 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
"Airline Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. CAB, 475 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
49 U.S.C.A. 5 1382 (Supp. 1979).




ployees.' In approving agreements under section 412, the Board
was not required to find that the end sought to be achieved by the
proposed agreement could not be attained in any less anticompeti-
tive manner. " Board approval must, however, be based upon a
showing of an appropriate factual predicate."
The Deregulation Act substantially alters Board consideration
and approval of pooling and other agreements. Only those agree-
ments, as defined by statute, which affect "foreign air transporta-
tion" are required to be filed with the Board." The Board is re-
quired to disapprove any such agreement affecting foreign air
transportation which is adverse to the public interest and must
approve any such agreement which it does not find to be adverse
to the public interest." Thus, the same legal standards and criteria
which formerly governed Board consideration of all joint agree-
ments will now control only those agreements affecting foreign air
transportation.
An air carrier may file with the Board any agreement, or re-
quest for authority to discuss a cooperative working agreement,
affecting interstate or overseas transportation, between such car-
rier and any other carrier." The Board is required to disapprove
any proposed contract or request for authority to discuss agree-
ments, even if previously approved by the Board, where the Board
finds the same to be adverse to the public interest; likewise, the
Board is required to approve any such agreement which it does not
find to be adverse to the public interest with certain exceptions."
Even if it finds an agreement not to be adverse to the public
interest, the Board may not approve:
(1) any agreement which substantially reduces or eliminates
competition unless it finds the same necessary to meet a serious
transportation need or to secure important benefits and does not
find that such need or benefits can be reasonably obtained by less
anticompetitive means;
4Airline Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. CAB, 475 F.2d 900, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
49United States v. CAB, 511 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
"0Id.
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(2) any agreement between an air carrier not directly engaged
in the operation of aircraft and air transportation and a common
carrier subject to the Interstate Commerce Act governing trans-
portation to be received by the common carrier; and
(3) any agreement limiting the level of capacity among air
carriers and markets in which they compete and fix rates, fares
or charges between or among air carriers."
Any party opposing a proposed agreement before the Board
has the burden of proving the reduction or elimination of com-
petition and the availability of other means having less anticom-
petitive effect; the party defending the proposed agreement shall
have the burden of proving the transportation need or public
benefits of the proposal."
When any proposed agreement or modification or cancellation
thereof is filed with the Board, or any request for authority to dis-
cuss possible agreements is made to the Board, the Attorney Gen-
eral and the Secretary of Transportation are to be furnished
written notice and opportunity to submit written comments on
the filing."'
The scope and content of mutual aid agreements" are severely
limited by the Deregulation Act. All mutual aid agreements ap-
proved by the Board before October 24, 1978, and in effect on
that date are deemed disapproved and not in effect after October
24, 1978.-
A carrier may not enter into a mutual aid agreement unless the
same is filed with and approved by the Board; the Board may
not, however, approve any such agreement unless it provides:
(1) any air carrier will not receive payments for any period
which exceed sixty percent of the direct operating expenses dur-
ing such period;'*
'td. § 1382(c)(2)(A)(i), (ii), (iii).
"Id. § 1382(c)(2)(B).
57 1d. S 1382(d).
58 The Act defines a "mutual aid agreement" as one between air carriers
providing that a party will receive payments from other carriers during which
the recipient is not engaged in air transportation or is providing reduced levels
of air service due to a labor strike. Id. § 1382(e)(3)(A).
5 Id. S 1382(e)(1).
' Id. § 1382(e) (2) (A). Direct operating expenses are defined to include in-
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(2) any benefits under the agreement are not payable for more
than eight weeks during any labor strike and that such benefits
may not be for losses incurred during the first thirty days of any
labor strike;"
(3 any party to such agreement will submit the issues caus-
ing any labor strike to binding arbitration pursuant to the Rail-
way Labor Act if the striking employees request such binding
arbitration.'
The Deregulation Act has thus significantly altered Board
authority to approve, and the standards for consideration of, pool-
ing and other agreements. This limitation, when combined with
the narrowed antitrust immunity which the Board may grant, re-
suits in increased application of the antitrust laws to the aviation
industry.
E. Antitrust Immunity
The regulatory scheme established by the Federal Aviation Act
has been described as "severely anticompetitive."" Section 414
illustrates the validity of this description. That section formerly
provided that any person "affected" by any order of the Board
under sections 408, 409 and 412 of the Act was thereby auto-
matically relieved from the operation of the antitrust laws insofar
as may be necessary to enable such person to do anything "author-
ized, approved, or required by such order.""
Judicial interpretation of this section established the concept
that conduct charged as violative of the antitrust laws is immunized
under section 414 when: (1) the conduct charged was approved
by a specific order of the Board or was clearly contemplated by
such an order; and (2) the Board monitored and supervised the
complained of conduct.' Individualized approval by the Board
was not necessary, however, for antitrust immunity, so long as the




"United States v. CAB, 511 F.2d 1315, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
-49 U.S.C.A. § 1384 (Supp. 1979).
'Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973);
Scroggins v. Air Cargo, Inc., 534 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Braniff Airways, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 724 (W.D. Tex. 1978).
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alleged conduct was clearly within the contemplation of Board
orders; thus, it suffices if the alleged conduct is the kind which
the Board has approved and authorized for the future." Section
414 was construed as exempting authorized conduct only so far
as the conduct complies with procedures prescribed by the Board.
Thus, the section was held not applicable to acts taken in viola-
tion of the procedural safeguards imposed by the Board."
The Deregulation Act makes substantial changes in the provi-
sions of section 414. As amended, the section now provides:
In any order made under section 1378, 1379 or 1382 of this title,
the Board may, as a part of such order, exempt any person affected
by such order from the operations of the "antitrust laws" set forth
in subsection (a) of section 12 of Title 15 to the extent necessary
to enable such person to proceed with the transaction specifically
approved by the Board in such order, and those transactions
necessarily contemplated by such order, except that the Board may
not exempt such person unless it determines that such exemption
is required in the public interest.8
The first significant change in section 414 is that the grant of
antitrust immunity is now discretionary with the Board. In exer-
cising such discretion, the Board must find and determine that
"exemption" (immunity from the antitrust laws) is required in
the public interest. In discussing the discretionary immunity grant
under new section 414, the Board has stated:
The purpose of Congress in rendering grants of immunity dis-
cretionary under amended section 414 was to eliminate the prac-
tice of routinely immunizing all transactions within the scope of
section 414. Section 414 now permits the Board to grant anti-
trust immunity to a merger (1) only to the extent necessary to
permit the transaction to go forward and (2) only when the Board
detrmines that such an exemption is required in the public
interest.9
The Board has stated that it believes that "full exposure to
antitrust liability is consistent with the marketplace orientation
08Scroggins v. Air Cargo, Inc., 534 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1976).
" Grueninger Int'l Travel, Inc. v. Air Transp. Ass'n of America, 551 F.2d
1324 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
68 49 U.S.C.A. § 1384 (Supp. 1979).
88 North Central-Southern Merger Case [1979J Av. L. REP. (CCH) 5 22,318.
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of the Airline Deregulation Act.' '70 Thus, since antitrust immunity
will be the exception rather than the rule, proposed airline activity
must now be analyzed on the assumption that the antitrust laws
will be applicable to the contemplated conduct.
II. APPLICATION OF FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS
The federal antitrust statute with which airlines will have the
most concern is the Sherman Antitrust Act. Although violations
of that statute have the potential for significant monetary and in-
junctive relief, it must be recognized that violations of the statute
are criminal felonies punishable by up to a million dollar fine for
a corporation and three years in jail or up to a one hundred thous-
and dollar fine for individuals."'
A. General Concepts
Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares illegal "every contract,
combination... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade." Construed
literally, section 1 would prohibit every form of business or com-
mercial contract. Thus, an agreement whereby a seller agreed to
furnish a certain raw material needed by the buyer in its manu-
facturing business, even for a limited time and in a limited quan-
tity, would thus be illegal, since it would prohibit a competitor of
the seller from competing for the buyer's limited business.
Faced with interpreting the broad and general wording of sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act, the courts have developed and articu-
lated a set of guiding principles a basic appreciation of which is
necessary for a proper understanding of the application of the
antitrust laws. In 1911 the Supreme Court, after analyzing the
common law view on restraints of trade and the legislative history
of the Sherman Act, held that section 1 would be construed to
prohibit only "unreasonable" restraints of trade." Under this "rule
of reason" test, the courts view all relevant factors and circum-
stances, including economic evidence, to determine whether a
70 Id.
7 15 U.S.C. §5 1, 2 (1976).
72Id. § 1.
"Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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"contract, combination or conspiracy" unduly restricts and hampers
competition."
In attempting to define the "rule of reason," Justice Brandeis
described the "true test of legality" to be whether the restraint
merely regulates and perhaps promotes competition or whether
it suppresses or even destroys competition. He identified various
relevant factors to be considered when applying the rule of reason
test:
(1) Facts peculiar to the business;
(2) The condition of the business before and after the restraint;
(3) The nature of the restraint and its effect;
(4) History of the restraint; and
(5) The reason and purpose for adopting the restraint. '
Other factors considered by the courts in applying the "rule of
reason" criteria include the motive underlying the restraint, the
relative positive and negative effects of the restraint, the power
of the parties in the markets they serve and whether other less re-
strictive means could have been employed to achieve the same de-
sired result." Generally, injury to the public must be established
before a restraint will be held to violate the "rule of reason.""
Certain forms of conduct have been declared to constitute per se
violations of section 1. Such types of conduct are considered un-
reasonable as a matter of law since they have a "pernicious effect
on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue"--and no eco-
nomic evidence will be received "as to the precise harm they caused
or the business excuse for their use."" The evolution of per se
rules required the courts to make broad generalizations about the
social utility of certain commercial practices."
The types of conduct condemned as per se violations of section
1 of the Sherman Act are:
(1) Price fixing;
' Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
r National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
7'Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir.
1977).
"7 Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. v. Rotary Drilling Serv., Inc., 383 F.2d 97 (5th
Cir. 1967).
" Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
"Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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(2) Market division or allocation;
(3) Group boycott; and
(4) Tying arrangements."
Agreements to fix or maintain prices, whether "horizontal" or
"vertical" have long been considered violative of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Horizontal agreements among competitors to fix
prices have uniformly been condemned by the courts as per se
violations."' In addition to specific price-fixing agreements, any
type of joint arrangement or concerted course of conduct which
raises, lowers or "stabilizes" prices is also illegal.' Vertical arrange-
ments between a seller and its customers which establish the cus-
tomer's resale price are also considered to be per se violations of
section L"
Conduct resulting in a division of markets among competitors
is also illegal per se under section 1." Many of the market division
schemes are part of or in furtherance of price-fixing activities."
Horizontal market division has been held to be per se unlawful
even when not involving price-fixing."
Group boycotts, or concerted refusals to deal, are illegal per se."
Since a seller, however, has a right unilaterally to refuse to deal,"
a refusal to deal must involve concerted or joint activity. Group
boycotts may involve both horizontal activities by competitors
or vertical activities between customers or suppliers."
Tying arrangements involve transactions wherein a seller con-
ditions its sales of a product or service (the "tying product")
upon the buyer's purchase of a separate product or service (the
"See notes 81-94 infra, and accompanying text.
" United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
" Id.
"Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
"Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
"Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
6 Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732 (9th
Cir.), cert denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954); Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v.
Consolidated Gas, Elec. Light & Power, 184 F.2d 552 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 906 (1950).
'
7 Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
"United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
"United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Klor's, Inc#
v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
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"tied product") from the seller or from a designated third party."
Generally, a tying arrangement will be held violative of the Sher-
man Act if the seller possesses sufficient economic power in the
tying product to produce an appreciable restraint in the market
for the tied item." The proper focus for determining whether the
seller possesses the requisite "sufficient economic power" in the
tying product is "whether the seller has the power to raise prices,
or impose other burdensome terms such as a tie-in, with respect to
any appreciable number of buyers within the market."" The re-
quirement of a not insubstantial restraint of commerce in the tied
product is determined by analyzing the total volume of sales tied
by the sales policy under challenge." As little as $60,800 has
been held not insubstantial."
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization or
attempts to monopolize, either of which may be effected by the
unilateral conduct of a specific person, and further prohibits any
combination or conspiracy to monopolize."' Thus, section 2 defines
three specific offenses: (1) monopolization; (2) attempts to mo-
nopolize; (3) any combination or conspiracy to monopolize.
Monopolization consists of the possession of monopoly power in
a relevant market and the willful acquisition of or maintenance of
that power as distinguished from development as a consequence of
a superior product, business acumen or historical accident." Mo-
nopoly power is "the power to control prices or exclude competi-
tion."9 The central issue is not whether prices are raised or that
competition is actually excluded, but that power exists to do so."
In order to measure monopoly power, a relevant market within
which to test that power must be established. Such market con-
sists of both a geographic and a product market. The relevant
geographic market is the area in which the sellers of the particular
"Northern Pac. RR. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
"Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
"Id. at 504.
Id. at 502.
"United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
" 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
"United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
'"Id. at 571.
"American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946).
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product are serviced and operate and to which purchasers can
practicably turn for such products or services." The relevant
product market is one which varies with the particular type of
commerce under consideration. The market consists of products
that have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which
they are produced-price, use and qualities considered. '
The required element of deliberateness or general intent to
monopolize, which must be further established when actual mo-
nopolization is claimed, has been held to be proved if the monopoly
was a probable result of the actions which were undertaken.'"
In most circuits, an unlawful attempt to monopolize effort may
be established by the following facts: (a) The defendant had a
specific intent to monopolize; and (b) there was a "dangerous
probability" that the attempt would be successful in achieving
monopoly in the relevant market.'0' Conspiracies to monopolize
involve essentially the same considerations which exist when mo-
nopoly results from internal growth."
In addition to criminal liability, section 4 of the Clayton Act
provides that any person injured in his business or property as a
result of a violation of the antitrust laws may recover damages,
which are then automatically trebled, and may also recover a
reasonable attorney's fee.' ' Class action procedures, actions by
state attorneys general in a parens patriae capacity" and injunc-
tive relief, which may be granted to private parties to prevent
violations of the antitrust laws," ' insure that antitrust violations
are vigorously pursued by a broad spectrum of claimants.
B. Specific Aviation Industry Activities
The application of the general principles governing the two
sections of the Sherman Act to several specific types of conduct
"Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
100 United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956).
' United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
"0' See, e.g., Sulmeyer v. Coca Cola Co., 515 F.2d 835, 850 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
"0'ABA, ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS 59 (1975).
10 15 U.S.C. 5 15 (1976).
1'Id. § 15(c).
'" Id. S 26 (1976 & Supp. 1978).
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engaged in by the airlines provides some guidance for determin-
ing the actual and potential antitrust implications of deregulation.
1. Fares
The Deregulation Act significantly alters the regulation of fares
by the Board. The Act establishes a "standard industry fare level"
as the fare level in effect on July 1, 1977."? The Act then pro-
vides that the Board shall not have any authority to determine
that a fare is too high if any proposed increase filed with the
Board on or after July 1, 1979, would not be more than five per-
cent higher than the standard industry fare level. With respect to
proposed decreases, the Board cannot find that a fare is too low
if a proposed decrease filed after October 24, 1978, would not be
more than fifty percent lower than the standard industry fare
level.1
The Board is required to adjust, at least semiannually, the
standard industry fare level by the percentage change from the
last previous period based on the actual operating cost per avail-
able seat-mile for combined interstate and overseas transporta-
tion." The flexibility provided by the Act to decrease fares, along
with the scheduled phaseout of the Board, means that the estab-
lishment and operation of fares will be subject to the full scope
of the federal antitrust laws.
Certain initial observations regarding the treatment of airline
fares under the federal antitrust laws, can be made. The Robinson-
Patman Act11 prohibits discrimination in the sale of "commodities"
and prohibits price-cutting for the purpose of injuring competition.
Airline transportation, however, should not be considered a "com-
modity," and thus will not be subject to the pricing provisions of
the Robinson-Patman Act."11
Several antitrust implications of pricing airline fares must be
considered. Both price-fixing and sales below average variable cost
are two important antitrust prohibitions affecting airline fares.
10749 U.S.C.A. § 1482(d)(6)(A) (Supp. 1979).
1-ld. 5 1482(d)(4)(A), (B).
109/d. § 1482(d)(6)(B).
110 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976).
1 Fleetway, Inc. v. Public Servs. Interstate Transp. Co., 72 F.2d 761 (3d
Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 626 (1935).
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Obviously, concerted or joint action in establishing fares, without
specific Board approval and a grant of antitrust immunity, consti-
tutes price-fixing. Although such a statement may seem unneces-
sary, the Board announced in January of 1979 that it had un-
covered preliminary evidence that some of the nation's top carriers
may have engaged in price-fixing in certain markets.112
Although the concept of price-fixing is constantly expanding,
it is generally considered to be any combination which has the
effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging or stabilizing prices. '
Even if the members of the combination were not in a position to
control the market, to the extent that they raised, lowered or
stabilized prices, their action is considered to be interfering with
the free play of market forces and thus constitutes price-fixing.'"
Separate and apart from the traditional "hard core" price-fixing
schemes, many other arrangements, much more subtle in nature,
have been held to constitute price-fixing. Among these arrange-
ments are rules concerning the extension of credit,"' agreements
concerning a maximum price for goods,' agreements to establish
or abolish discounts.1 . and agreements concerning a general price
range within which sales are to be made.' The antitrust implica-
tion in this area is obvious for the airline industry: no discussions,
communications or "knowing winks" concerning fares can occur.
One additional aspect of price-fixing must be considered. Econo-
mists can logically and convincingly explain that within the mar-
ketplace prices for the same product sold by different sellers
eventually reach the same level. Right or wrong, this general con-
cept has enmeshed itself in the legal fabric of the antitrust laws.
Price uniformity among competitors does not in and of itself vio-
late the antitrust laws.11' As long as pricing decisions are the result
of independent business judgment, no "agreement" as required by
112 895 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-2 (Jan. 4, 1979).
" 
3 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
114 Id. at 224.
"'Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
'"
1 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1950).
117 United States v. Olympia Provision & Baking Co., 282 F. Supp. 819
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), afl'd, 393 U.S. 480 (1969).
"'United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
1"'Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount, 346 U.S. 537 (1954); United States v.
International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927).
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section 1 of the Sherman Act exists, even if the result of such
independent decisions is that competitors reach the same level in
their pricing. In antitrust jargon, "conscious parallelism" does not
satisfy the requisite "contract, combination or conspiracy" re-
quired by section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Parallel pricing may be the foundation leading to a price-fixing
determination. Where such parallel activity exists, the presence
of additional factors may result in illegal price-fixing. Such addi-
tional factors have included price discussions and exchange of
price information.'" Likewise, where conscious parallel pricing is
contrary to the best interests of the participants, or is not other-
wise supported by legitimate business reasons, such activity may
also be indicative of price-fixing conspiracy.1"'
The "parallel pricing" situation would seem to provide a par-
ticular area of vulnerability for the airline industry. With fare
levels having been traditionally set by the Board, prices have been
basically the same for the same routes. The Deregulation Act
establishes a "zone" within which prices may rise or fall."" Coupled
with the active trade association situation within the airline indus-
try, particular concern must exist among airlines with respect to
parallel pricing activities.
It is logical to assume that the Board, and the Justice Depart-
ment, will allow some initial period of time for the industry to
accustom itself to being subject to the strictures of antitrust laws.
Such "honeymoon" may, however, prove relatively short.
The recent rash of discount fares within the industry raises
another serious issue under the antitrust laws concerning the
pricing of airline fares. When a business chooses to price at a non-
remunerate level in order to exclude or drive out its competi-
tion, such "predatory pricing" may be a method of obtaining or
maintaining a monopoly position in violation of section 2 of the
Sherman Act. ' Obviously, any legitimate price decrease will
10 See National Lead Co. v. FTC, 227 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1955), rev'd on
other grounds, 352 U.S. 419 (1957).
.. Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1957); Ambrook
Enterprises v. Time, Inc. [1979-2] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 62,979.
12249 U.S.C.A. § 1482(d)(4) (Supp. 1979).
121 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Janich Bros.,




necessarily have some impact on other firms in the market. The
antitrust laws are concerned with competition, which necessarily
means that vigorous and efficient firms will drive out the less
efficient firms. Otherwise stated, the concern of the antitrust laws
is with competition and not competitors.
Pricing is considered predatory only where the firm foregoes
short-term profits in order to develop a market position such that
the firm can later raise prices and recoup lost profits."' Prices set
at or above marginal cost ordinarily will not form the basis for
antitrust violation."' Average variable cost, which is more easily
ascertained from conventional business records, can generally be
used as evidence of marginal cost."' Without analyzing in detail
the accounting principles involved, sales below "cost" for a par-
ticular route, particularly on a short-run basis, may well form
the basis for a claim of attempt to monopolize.
As mentioned previously, section 2 of the Sherman Act can be
violated by a single firm; an attempt to monopolize, even if un-
successful, can be a violation of the statute. Thus, the pricing of
discount or other introductory fares must be carefully considered.
Although the issue is not without doubt, a single route may in
fact be considered a "market" under section 2. Furthermore, some
precedent does exist for claims that airline fare pricing below
cost can result in antitrust violations."" Issues such as the proper
allocation of general and administrative expenses and other simi-
lar cost-accounting problems are not subject to definitive answer
and are still being considered by the courts. Significant and pro-
longed pricing below cost will, however, cause serious antitrust
risks.
2. Routes
The Deregulation Act makes various significant changes in
standards and procedures governing route entry and exit. The
124 Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Sec. 2 of
the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975).
'22 Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 857 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1979).
126 Id.
127 Foremost Int'l Tours, Inc. v. Qantas Airways, Ltd., 379 F. Supp. 88 (D.
Hawaii 1974), aff'd, 525 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816
(1976).
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automatic entry program," the unused or dormant route con-
cept, '29 and the authority of the Board to issue certificates to test
or assess experimental services'" provide new programs for route
entry and exit. Additionally, the Act softens the "public conven-
ience and necessity" test which had generally governed route
awards."
The sunset provisions of the Deregulation Act will result in a
totally unregulated airline route structure by 1981." Thus, despite
the liberalization of route award authority and standards, the in-
dustry will soon be faced with no regulation in the area of routes.
The antitrust laws contemplate vigorous, competition in the market-
place. "Antitrust legislation is concerned primarily with the health
of the competitive process, not with the individual competitor who
must sink or swim in competitive enterprise. -
The selection of routes to be served by a particular airline
should not, in and of itself, cause significant antitrust implica-
tions. Rather, the implementation of such selection poses the
greatest risk. As an example, the selection of a previously un-
serviced route, accompanied by a saturation of frequency of
service and extended below-cost pricing, may well result in an
illegal attempt to monopolize in violation of section 2 of the
Sherman Act. Such result, however, is a function of performance
on a selected route, rather than the selection of a route.
Situations may exist, however, where route selection could
have certain antitrust implications. The systematic confrontation
of a small, less financially able competitor on a route by route
basis may result in a pattern of conduct held to be a violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act. Thus, although route selection
generally seems to have minimal antitrust implications, care must
be taken to insure that selection is based on merit of the route,
rather than an obvious attempt to eliminate a competitor.
12849 U.S.C.A. S 1371(d) (7) (A) (Supp. 1979).
I2 ld. S 1371(d)(5).
I'id. 5 1371(d)(8).
... See id. § 1371(d)(1), (3), which provides a test of "consistent with the
public convenience and necessity."
IdM. S 1551.
1 3 Internaional Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714,




The trade associations have played a significant role in many
aspects of the aviation industry. The Air Traffic Conference
(ATC), composed of most of the nation's major domestic airlines,
and the International Air Transport Association (IATA), com-
posed of most of the world's major international carriers, have
been involved in regulating many aspects of the aviation industry.
It is in the areas of trade associations and their activities that sig-
nificant antitrust risks exist and where substantial and significant
changes will have to occur.
Under section 412 of the Act,"4 the ATC and IATA file agree-
ments affecting air transportation with the Board. The Board has
traditionally granted antitrust immunity to such agreements pur-
suant to its authority under section 414 of the Act."= The nature
of agreements approved by the Board, and instituted by these
"trade associations," has been extremely comprehensive.
The ATC has regulated virtually all of the nation's travel agents,
and the IATA has regulated virtually all of the nation's interna-
tional travel agents. Included within the regulation of such travel
agents was "rate-fixing" by virtue of the collective activities of
the airlines. The Board has stated its intention to conduct overall
reviews of various ATC programs to determine whether they should
continue to receive Board approval." The Department of Justice
continues to attack the activities of both the ATC and the IATA."'
It is inconceivable that the ATC and IATA will continue to oper-
ate with any recognizable resemblance to their prior activities.
Although the Justice Department will have authority to approve
joint agreements, such approval should not be considered as even
a realistic remote possibility.
In today's antitrust climate, mere trade association member-
ship, regardless of the ostensibly "legitimate" activities of the
group, raises significant antitrust exposure. The risk that some
13449 U.S.C.A. S 1382 (Supp. 1979).
Id. § 1384.
In re Members of the Air Traffic Conferences of America, CAB Docket
No. 34,142, CAB Order No. 79-5-16 (May 1, 1979), at 4.
137TRADE REG. REP., No. 416, Dec. 17, 1979, at 7 (referring to Reply of the
Department of Justice, Competition for Agency Services Show Cause Proceeding,
CAB Docket No. 36,596).
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trade association members may engage in illegal activities under
the protective umbrella of the association, thus exposing other
members to potential laiblity, is real. Predicting the member-
ship, scope of activities and overall value of the ATC and
IATA in several years is virtually impossible. Permissible ac-
tivities of trade associations include joint advertising cam-
paigns, education and training, research and development proj-
ects, code of ethics, lobbying and certain types of statistical
gathering activities.'"' Thus, to the extent that airline trade asso-
ciations in the future limit their activities within the boundaries,
they can continue to serve the industry.
The principal danger of trade association membership and
activity is the potential for a determination that the trade associa-
tion and its members are engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy.
Statistical reports by the association concerning disclosure of prices
may have the effect of fixing prices." The disclosure of current
or estimated cost data and price statistics, or estimated future
transactions, may furnish the basis for a determination of an
"unspoken" price-fixing conspiracy."
The activities of the ATC and IATA will change dramatically
in the next few years. These organizations, their memberships
and functions must be scrutinized closely by the industry to insure
that the new era of competition does not result in an unwitting
antitrust violation.
4. Other Activities
With approval of the Board, airlines have engaged in various
other types of joint activity, outside the scope of the ATC and
IATA. In 1947, the airlines jointly created Air Cargo, Inc., to
serve as the agent for the airlines in handling of air cargo. The
agreement creating this entity was approved by the Board. "' The
existence and operation of Air Cargo, Inc., has generated sub-
stantial private antitrust litigation." Requests for Board approval
...See C. HILLS, ANTITRUST ADVISER § 7.18 (2d ed. 1978).
'"American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
'4°United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923).
141 Scroggins v. Air Cargo, Inc., 534 F.2d 1124, 1127 (5th Cir. 1976).
'Scroggins v. Air Cargo, Inc., 534 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1976); Big Bear
Cartage v. Air Cargo, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 982 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Breen Air Freight,
1024
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS
for joint airline activity continue. Among the most recent was a
request by the airlines for the Board to grant antitrust immunity
to discussions concerning how and where to print on airline tickets
information about what airlines will do in the event a flight is
cancelled or late.'"
Joint activity, whether creating a wholly owned subsidiary to
perform some type of agency function or to have discussion re-
garding the format of tickets, will not exist in the era of full com-
petition. The Board, and certainly the Justice Department, will
not be sympathetic nor understanding to a perceived need for
joint activity. Thus, the era of joint enterprise in the aviation in-
dustry has ended.
III. CONCLUSION
The federal antitrust laws and comprehensive federal regulatory
systems have coexisted for many years. Despite the difficulty of
the task, the courts have attempted to construe the duties and
responsibilities of the administrative agencies, and the scope and
coverage of the antitrust laws, to attain a coordinated end.'"
Within this conflicting and sometimes guideless framework, both
regulators and industry operated.
Regulation by the CAB was generally guided by the premise
that airlines were public utilities, utilizing the public airways and
providing an indispensable public service. Thus, many facets of
airline activities were regulated on the basis of assuring a fair and
adequate return on investment to the airlines, with competition
being a somewhat insubstantial consideration. The airline indus-
try has been chosen to be the first "victim" or "beneficiary," de-
pending on a given point of view, of deregulation. Regardless of
the merits of the concept, it is alive, well and real.
Predicting all of the antitrust implications of airline deregula-
tion is obviously impossible. Certain general conclusions, however,
concerning the impact of deregulation can be reached. Initially,
and perhaps foremost, deregulation will require a new approach
Ltd. v. Air Cargo, Inc., 470 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
932 (1973).
143TRADE REG. REP., No. 412, Nov. 19, 1979.
'"United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183 (1939).
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by airlines to analyzing and making business decisions. The anti-
trust consequences of each business activity must be analyzed and
considered in detail prior to undertaking a given course. Thus,
the airline industry will be required to approach its activities with
new considerations and consequences in mind.
The concept of joint activity among the airlines has been a fact
of life in the industry for many years. Deregulation has substan-
tially altered, if not completely eliminated, this concept. Each
joint or collective activity within the industry must now be ana-
lyzed anew and tested under the strictures of the antitrust laws.
In essence, joint activity will be the exception rather than the rule.
Despite the continued existence of executive authority to im-
munize certain types of airline activity from the antitrust laws,
deregulation will mean, as a practical matter, that the airline in-
dustry will be subject to the full scope of the antitrust laws. Com-
petition, with its inevitable losers in the marketplace is the bench
mark of the law of antitrust. A rapid acceptance and implementa-
tion of that concept by the aviation industry will ease the transition
into the era of deregulation. The argument over the concept is
moot. The consequences are too great not to heed the mandate.
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